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Introduction
Dramatically rising health expenditure costs in the last decades, in particular for prescription pharmaceuticals, have triggered ongoing debates about cost-sharing between health insurers and beneficiaries.
1 For instance, in the US, a reform of Medicare (a federal program which provides health insurance for the elderly) which went into effect in 2006 (Medicare Part D) introduced coverage of prescription drug expenditure for Medicare beneficiaries. There is, however, a coinsurance rate (the fraction of expenditure on medical services paid by the insured patient) of 25 percent.
2
It is typically argued that, compared to full coverage, cost-sharing schemes limit the growth of health insurance premiums. There is a large empirical literature on the effects of prescription drug cost-sharing on health costs and health care utilization.
Empirical estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in patients' prescription drug charge (through higher coinsurance or higher copayment) reduces prescription drug spending by 1 to 6 percent.
3
In contrast to such short-run demand effects of prescription drugs cost-sharing, long-run supply effects on pharmaceutical innovation are underresearched. Generally, a major concern in designing health insurance systems and regulating the pharmaceutical 1 In the EU, the average annual real growth rate of spending for pharmaceuticals was 4.7 percent (3.8 percent in Germany) between and 2008 (OECD, 2010 . In the US, there was a more than fivefold increase in spending for prescription drugs between 1990 and 2006 from 40.3 to 216.7 billion USD (see "The Kaiser Family Foundation. Prescription drug trends", available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/3057-03.cfm).
2 The rate applies after some deductible, up to an initial coverage limit. After a "catastrophic" coverage limit is reached, the coinsurance rate drops to 5 percent. In Switzerland basically all health insurance contracts have a coinsurance rate of 20 percent for branded prescription drugs and 10 percent for generic drugs.
3 Goldman, Joyce and Zheng (2007) and Gemmill, Thomson and Mossialos (2008) provide metastudies on this expenditure elasticity. Motheral and Henderson (1999) find that demand effects are prevalent with respect to branded drugs only. Landsman et al. (2005) suggests as well that demand for prescription drugs is quite inelastic. The most convincing evidence on demand effects of cost-sharing schemes comes from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Based on data from this randomized experiment, Leibowitz (1985) finds that per capita prescriptions were 25 percent higher for patients with zero coinsurance than for patients who faced a 50 percent coinsurance rate, and 50 percent higher than for those who faced a 95 percent coinsurance rate. Possibly as a consequence of reduced utilization of pharmaceuticals, some studies find that increased cost-sharing results in greater use of inpatient and emergency medical services of patients with chronic diseases like congestive heart failure, lipid disorders, diabetes and schizophrenia but had little effect on health care utilization of patients with non-chronic diseases (e.g., Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008). sector is the tension between keeping prices low and ensuring that quality is high.
The main issue therefore is the joint impact of cost-sharing schemes on price-setting behavior and the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to conduct R&D. As pointed out by Berndt (2002, p.45) : "The resolution of this static versus dynamic efficiency conflict is likely the single most important issue facing the pharmaceutical industry". This paper attempts to shed light on the nature of the price-quality relationship in pharmaceutical markets. It examines the role of cost-sharing and price regulations in health insurance systems for both pharmaceutical R&D and drug prices. We also explore the effects of entry deregulation, which may be seen as an attempt to lower prices of pharmaceuticals. The main issue again is whether price reductions come at the costs of less quality-improvements of pharmaceuticals.
The proposed theoretical model builds on the "ideal variety" framework, originated by Lancaster (1979) . Although the framework has never been applied in the context of pharmaceutical markets and vertical R&D (to the best of my knowledge), 4 it captures well the notion that patients seek the ideal drug for their type of illness. 5 The horizontal location of a pharmaceutical firm is interpreted as the type of illness to which the drug that the firm produces is targeted to, represented as a point on the circumference of a circle. That is, pharmaceuticals are imperfect substitutes to each other. 6 Firms choose their horizontal location along with prices and R&D spending.
We show that introducing insurance coverage of prescription drug expenditure (like Medicare Part D) raises both drug prices and pharmaceutical R&D spending, whereas an increase in the coinsurance rate within an existing cost-sharing scheme has the opposite effect. Intuitively, a lower coinsurance rate makes demand for pharmaceuticals less price-sensitive and therefore allows firms to charge higher price-cost margins. This, 4 The ideal variety model is sometimes used in the international trade literature (e.g. Helpman, 1981; Wong, 1995; Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2009) . 5 Besides realism in this respect, the ideal variety framework also has the attractive feature that the price elasticity of demand depends on the competitive environment of firms. Notably the standard version of the alternative (and far more often applied) "love of variety" model of monopolistic competition by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) predicts that the price elasticity of demand for a good − and thus the price mark-up − is constant. However, the empirical support for this prediction is generally weak. Under a constant price elasticity, the health insurance system could not have any effect on prices for pharmaceuticals. 6 Examples are pain killers, antibiotics, hypertension medication, and pharmaceutical cancer therapy.
in turn, boosts the return to R&D.
By contrast, deregulation of entry may induce higher R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector despite reducing price-setting power. The result suggests that the repeated claim by pharma lobbyists − that anything which raises drug prices and profits in the pharmaceutical sector would be conducive to R&D − is potentially erroneous.
Competition policy may rather be seen as a tool to raise the quality of pharmaceuticals and limit drug expenditure at the same time. Policy measures may include encouraging entry of foreign firms, restricting marketing practices which effectively work as entry barriers, and reducing patent breadth. In fact, patent breadth has a natural representation in the proposed model, as a segment on the circumference of the circle of illnesses which includes the point targeted by a pharmaceutical firm; patent protection means that potential rivals are prohibited to locate on this segment.
We also examine the role of two kinds of price regulations for pharmaceuticals.
First, as practiced in France and Italy, prices may directly be set by the government.
We focus on the simple case where such price controls ignore R&D costs and show that stricter direct price regulation unambiguously reduces R&D expenditure. Second, we study the effects of a price cap − a limit amount of a patients' expenses for a drug which is reimbursed by an insurer. Such cost-sharing device is common in the public health insurance system of Germany and Japan. We show that a stricter price cap reduces both R&D spending on pharmaceuticals and drug prices. The results on the R&D expenditure effects of price regulations are consistent with a large body of empirical evidence (e.g., Scherer, 1993; Vernon, 2005; Giaccotto, Santerre and Vernon, 2005) .
Finally, whereas (wage) income is exogenous in the basic model, in an extension we discuss the interplay between health status and income in a dynamic general equilibrium context with pharmaceutical R&D and endogenous innovation also outside the pharmaceutical sector. The analysis accounts for the potential dependency of effective labor supply on health status. On the one hand, higher wages boost demand for pharmaceuticals and therefore enhances R&D incentives of pharmaceutical companies. On the other hand, a better health status raises aggregate productivity and wages. We analyze how health policy and increased entry into the pharmaceutical sector affects the interaction between health status and economic well-being.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation of our analysis to the literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model with a focus on coinsurance policy.
Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium of the basic model by distinguishing the case of restricted entry where the number of pharmaceutical firms is given from the one with an endogenous number of firms. Section 5 examines the effects of price regulations for pharmaceuticals. Section 6 closes the model by endogenizing wages and allowing for R&D activity outside the pharmaceutical sector in a simple endogenous growth framework. The last section concludes.
Related Literature
There are only few studies on the relationship between health policy and innovation incentives of pharmaceutical firms. At the theoretical level, Garber, Jones and Romer (2006) analyze the case of a single-product monopoly firm which sells a pharmaceutical product. The drug is assumed to have heterogenous effects on the utility of ill consumers. The authors show that a coinsurance rate which ensures efficient drug utilization implies that profits of the monopoly firm may exceed consumer surplus; thus, R&D incentives may be excessive. Lakdawella and Sood (2005) analyze a similar framework and argue that a health insurance contract which sets copayment at marginal costs and where innovators are paid an ex-ante fee equal to consumer surplus may at the same time achieve two goals: it may lead to efficient drug utilization and provide efficient incentives for introducing the drug into the market. More recently, Lakdawella and Sood (2009) argue that a public health insurance system with some price-negotiation by the government is welfare-improving, particularly when coupled with an increase in patent length.
The framework proposed in this paper is different to this literature in several respects. First, it captures both horizontal and vertical differentiation of pharmaceuticals. Second, it analyzes product market competition among pharmaceutical com-panies rather than a monopoly firm. While monopoly situations may exist in some pharmaceutical markets, the exclusive focus on these situations may be considered as a shortcoming for many other markets like those for cancer medication, hypertension medication, pain killers, and antibiotics. In such markets there is some substitutability within product groups and pharmaceutical companies engage in price competition.
Third, and related, the main contribution of this paper may be to provide a unified framework which allows us to develop a differentiated view on the price-quality relationship in pharmaceutical markets by encompassing both health insurance and competition policy. The salient feature to analyze competition policy is to depart from the standard monopoly assumption. Fourth, we also provide a general equilibrium perspective which allows us to explore the link between health and income through endogenous vertical innovations within and outside the pharmaceutical sector. Finally, the focus is on a positive rather than a normative analysis.
At the empirical level, Acemoglu, Cutler, Finkelstein and Linn (2006) Importantly, the present paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between entry regulation and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Extending the standard ideal variety framework to a context with pharmaceutical R&D delivers predictions which are consistent with evidence that a higher intensity of competition may spur innovation (e.g., Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, 1999; Aghion et al., 2009 ).
That competition may be positively linked to R&D has also been pointed out by Schumpeterian growth theory (surveyed by Howitt, 2005, 2009) , challenging predictions of standard models of endogenous technical change. In Schumpeterian growth theory, however, the possibility that competition fosters innovation rests on the feature that firms can preserve a monopoly by innovating and their incentives to search for a superior technology rises when the entry threat is enlarged. In our theory, heterogeneity and prospect of monopoly is not needed to obtain the result that entry deregulation spurs innovative effort. Moreover, we distinguish health − and demand for pharmaceuticals which is affected by the health system − from "regular" consumption goods.
Finally, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Aghion, Howitt and Murtin (2010) (2001) propose a Lucas-type growth model, extended to include the production of health services and longevity, which is capable to explain productivity slowdowns by low productivity of the health-sector. Sanso and Aísa (2006) show that the long-run growth rate of the economy critically depends on the rate at which the efficacy of the resources devoted to health decreases with biological age. These papers do not consider policy issues, however. The present paper does not explicitly model life expectancy but shows how health policy and entry deregulation jointly affects the quality of pharmaceuticals and aggregate productivity in a simple endogenous growth framework.
The Basic Model
There is a unit mass of individuals, indexed by . Individuals draw utility  () from consumption of a homogenous (numeraire) good, (), and their health status, (), according to utility function
with partial derivatives    0,    0,    0,   ≤ 0, and   ≥ 0 (i.e., the marginal utility from consumption is non-decreasing in the health level).
An individual becomes ill with probability . Cai, Mavromaras and Oguzoglu (2008) . They find that individuals who experience health shocks respond by incremental reductions in labor supply rather than by leaving the labor force.
antibiotics. Typically, a specific kind of antibiotic kills or prevents breeding of a rather wide spectrum of bacteria but is more effective against certain types of bacteria than others. As a final example, there are several classes of medication against hypertension.
Products are quite substitutable, targeting different sources of high blood pressure and differing with respect to side effects. Thus, the structure of the pharmaceutical market is represented here by oligopolistic competition on prices for differentiated goods.
Price setting power arises because pharmaceutical products cannot be imitated, e.g. because of patent protection. Patent breadth has a natural representation in the model. It is defined as the sum of the lengths of the segments on the circumference of the circle of illnesses to the left and right of the location of firm  (representing the closest substitutes to product ) where rivals are not allowed to locate. Consider a symmetric situation where the distance between the location of each firm on circumference of the circle (with unit length) is 1. This is also the size of the segment on the circle of each firm (05 on both sides of a firm's location) which is protected by patent law.
Thus, if the patent breadth is at least 1, then no additional firm is allowed to enter.
The restricted entry case may therefore be interpreted as a situation where no firm can enter despite positive profits because it would infringe a patent. An increase in the firm number  may thus reflect a change in the patent law which reduces the patent breadth such that more firms can enter. An alternative competition policy which raises  in the restricted entry case would be to encourage entry of foreign firms.
In the case of an endogenous number of firms, it is assumed that the patent breadth is smaller than the equilibrium value of 1. A decrease in  in the endogenous entry case may capture, for instance, lower administrative costs associated with weaker entry regulation (for examples and measurement, see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes and Shleifer, 2002) . Also extensive marketing effort of pharma firms for branded prescription drugs via sales representatives (who directly contact physicians) erect entry barriers for potential rivals. Such entry barriers could be reduced (again, captured by a decrease in ) by regulating the activities of sales representatives in the pharmaceutical sector like restraining gift-giving to physicians. Also prohibiting drug makers to use doctors' prescribing data to develop marketing strategies could lead to a decrease in  .
Pharmaceutical firms can affect the "quality" (i.e. the vertical dimension) of drugs by incurring R&D costs. Higher quality means that the health status improves for a given type of illness to which the drug is targeted to and possibly also for related illnesses. To capture both the horizontal and vertical dimension of pharmaceuticals, suppose that health status of an ill individual  when consuming one unit of drug  is
where   () is the shorter (arc) distance between the illness of consumer  and the horizontal location of firm 's product on the circumference of the circle of illnesses;   is the quality of drug . We assume that function  has partial derivatives    0 (i.e., the health level is lower when the drug is less suited),
(recall that unity is the upper limit of the health level by definition), and   ≤ 0 (i.e., the marginal gain in health from a quality-improvement is non-increasing in the quality level); moreover, suppose   ≤ 0 and    0. Property    0 implies a ranking of the impact of higher R&D on health improvement for different patients. For instance, consider a drug which contains antibiotics. Suppose the drug is best suited to fight (a specific form of) pneumonia but also works against some other illnesses caused by bacteria. However, also suppose the bacteria which cause pneumonia have developed some antibiotic resistance. Then    0 means that an increase in R&D spending directed to overcome antibiotic resistance of bacteria which cause pneumonia has a larger effect on health for patients with pneumonia than for patients with other bacterial infections.
8
To supply a drug with quality   , firm  has to incur R&D costs (  ) which are
Following the "endogenous sunk cost" approach (e.g., Sutton, 1991 Sutton, , 1998 ) and "quality ladder" models of endogenous growth (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991) , R&D costs are not reflected in marginal production costs.
9
Illnesses are assumed to be perfectly and costlessly detectable by diagnostic tests.
Moreover, individuals know the horizontal and vertical location of each firm, as well as function , and therefore are capable of choosing the product which maximizes their utility. Alternatively, one may assume that physicians choose on behalf and in the interest of patients. To abstract from informational constraints greatly simplifies the analysis.
10
To distinguish pharmaceuticals from "regular" consumption goods, we assume that more is not better. More precisely, ill individuals do not gain from consuming more than one dose of a drug. For simplicity, they also do not gain from consuming different drugs.
11
For reasons of tractability, we follow the common assumption in ideal variety models that firms simultaneously choose price and their "location" on the circumference of the product circle to maximize profits. In the present context, they also choose the quality   of a drug at the same time.
12
Finally, suppose that there exists a health insurance system which covers the risk of needing drug treatment. However, patients themselves have to pay a fraction  ∈ [0 1]
potential innovators which are risk-neutral. In this case, neither supply of R&D funds is affected by uncertainty (due to the law of large numbers) nor is demand. 10 A priori, it seems unclear whether and how the nature of price competition in the pharmaceutical market would change under asymmetric information between physicians and patients and/or under limited information of both. These are challenging issues which are beyond the scope of the present paper.
11 For some diseases treatment is more effective when several drugs are combined, like for attacking HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. In our context, this would be captured by defining a drug as a combination of active pharmaceutical ingredients in one dose. Many drugs contain several active ingredients, so it does not matter if those are combined in, say, one injection/pill or provided via several different injections/pills.
12 Assuming that prices and quality are chosen simultaneously draws on the seminal paper on R&D choice under imperfect competition in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) . It is shown in Appendix C that assuming a two-stage decision process may not change results. There we suppose that firms choose the type of horizontal differentiation along with the vertical quality component at stage 1, whereas at stage 2 they choose prices (product market competition). If at stage 1 firms take prices of other firms as given (along with product quality and horizontal location), then the behavior of firms is shown to be exactly the same as in the case where there is just one decision stage. That is, nothing changes compared to the analysis presented in the main body of the paper if we assume that firms take the effect of their product differentiation choices on their own price setting power at stage 2 into account but do not account for the possible equilibrium price adjustments of and due to rivals at stage 2. Unfortunately, relaxing the latter assumption would complicate the analysis to the point of intractability.
of the price of medication − the coinsurance rate. 13 Health insurance is assumed to be fair, i.e., the insurance premium,  , is equal to the expected reimbursement of patients' medication expenses from the insurance. In the next section we examine the effect of an increase in the coinsurance rate  on the R&D expenditure of pharmaceutical firms and on prices of their products.
Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the location of firm  on the circumference of the circle of illnesses. Denote the firm to the left of  by   and the firm to the right of  by   . The shorter (arc) distance between the location of  and   is denoted by   (  ) and the one between
is the distance between   and   . Denote 13 We abstract from moral hazard − although sometimes being the alleged reason for implementing coinsurance schemes in the first place. This argument is unconvincing in the case of severe illness like cancer or AIDS, however. In any case, health insurance systems are exogenous in our analysis.
by   the patient with the ideal variety to the left of firm 's location, who is indifferent between buying from firm  and   . Similarly, consumer   is indifferent between buying from  and   .
As shown in Fig. 1 
is the distance between  and   . Define by
the health levels of consumer   and   , respectively, when consuming drug  (eq. (3)) and the alternative drugs   ,   (eq. (4)). The associated consumption levels are given
where
is wage income of an individual with health level ,   is the coinsurance payment when consuming the drug supplied by firm , and  is the insurance premium. Note that (  +  ) is the mass of consumers buying from firm  (recall that a mass  of consumers is ill). Thus, with fair health insurance, the insurance premium for each individual is
For individual   , who is indifferent to buy from firm  and   , we have
Substituting the respective first equations of (3)- (6) into (8) reveals that   is implicitly given as function of own price and quality, price and quality of the com-petitor to the left, the distance to this competitor, and parameters. Write
Similarly, for individual   , who is indifferent to buy from firm  and   , we have
Using the respective second equations of (3)- (6), (9) implies that we can write
The profit maximization problem of firm  can then be written as
We first derive the equilibrium of the basic model for a given number of firms (restricted entry) and present comparative-static results. Then we allow for unrestricted entry, where the number of firms is endogenous, demonstrating that the main insights from the restricted entry case typically still hold.
Restricted Entry
An equilibrium in the restricted entry case is defined as locational choices, drug prices, and drug quality levels, in which firms maximize profits and ill consumers choose the drug which yields the highest utility given the choices of firms. Using expression (7) for the premium  in the first-order conditions which result from (10), we can derive the following lemma. (All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. In a symmetric equilibrium for a given number of firms, where
are simultaneously given by
as functions of    , where
is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and health under symmetry.
The first summand on the right-hand side of eq. (11) is the marginal benefit of raising quality  which, in profit maximum, must be equal to the marginal cost of improving quality,  0 (). The marginal benefit of raising  is higher, the higher the price-cost margin,  − , the larger the total market size of the pharmaceutical market, , the higher the effectiveness of R&D for health,   , and the lower is the impact on health status of deviating from the ideal variety of a patient, |  |. To see intuitively that the ratio    |  | matters for R&D incentives consider again the case of antibiotics.
The innovation incentive is higher, the larger is for a given type of bacterium which causes an illness the effect of higher quality  on health status,   , and the wider the spectrum of bacteria and illnesses affected by the antibiotic (i.e., |  | is lower).
Eq. (12) reflects that, not surprisingly, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and health matters for price-setting behavior of firms. Prices are also affected by the marginal impact of an increase in health on wage income,  0 , which determines demand for pharmaceuticals as well. Moreover, demand becomes more price-sensitive when the coinsurance rate,  , increases.
A symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique under weak conditions. An example of sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model is spelled out in Appendix B.
Uniqueness of equilibrium allows us to derive comparative-static results.
14 Arguments  and  are suppressed in functions  ,  and . 
The intuition for the negative impact of a higher coinsurance rate,  , on R&D spending and prices (part (a) of Proposition 1) is simple. An increase in the fraction of the drug price which a patient has to copay implies that she becomes more pricesensitive. Thus, by raising the price of its drug, a pharmaceutical company loses more customers to rivals. This induces firms to lower the prices as an equilibrium response.
Consequently, also the equilibrium insurance premium,  * = (1 −  ) * , is decreasing in  . In turn, however, the reduced mark-up over marginal costs,  − , lowers the marginal benefit of R&D.
By contrast, a higher wage rate, , raises the willingness to pay for drugs of ill consumers due to two effects. First, the price sensitivity declines after an increase in  if better health raises the supplied labor units ( 0  0). This effect arises since the marginal impact of better health on wage income rises with . Second, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and health,     , is increasing in . Both effects go in the same direction and explain part (b).
Part (c) of Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. Elasticity  measures by how much the marginal benefit of higher drug quality on health (  ) declines if  increases by one percent. Recall that a higher  means that the drug is less suited to the particular illness of a patient. Now suppose that the number of pharmaceuticals increases. As a result, a firm loses customers for a given R&D spending since, on average,  decreases. Consequently, for a given price of a drug and implied by    0, there is a higher incentive to conduct R&D in order to retain some of the customers.
This effect is large if  is high. Thus, firms may conduct more R&D despite the fact that price-setting power is adversely affected by an increase in the number of rivals.
15
The latter result is interesting for two reasons. 
Endogenous Number of Firms
We now show that the basic insights of Proposition 1 are not critically affected by allowing for an endogenous number of firms. With unrestricted entry, in equilibrium, profits of firms must be zero, as firms enter the market as long as profits are positive.
In a symmetric situation the zero-profit condition holds if
according to profit function (10). The equilibrium quality, price, and number of firms, denoted by ( * *   * *   * * ), are simultaneously given by equation system  =  =  = 0. We define matrix
As shown in the proof of the following proposition, the determinant of M is positive under weak conditions, implying uniqueness of equilibrium. tends to promote entry ( * * increases) and raises  * * if (14) holds.
Proposition 2 shows that the impact of an increase in the coinsurance rate and in the wage rate on R&D spending and on prices of pharmaceuticals is robust to allowing for endogenous entry of firms.
Moreover, not surprisingly, the number of firms typically declines if entry costs go up. Consistent with the effects of a change in the number of firms under restricted entry (part (c) of Proposition 1), retarding entry by higher fixed costs tends to be associated with reduced R&D spending if  is high.
Price Regulations
This section examines the effects of price regulations. We distinguish direct price controls and price caps on drug expenditure reimbursement. In its simplest form, on which we focus in this section, a price control means that the government sets a fixed, maximum drug price in a regime where health insurance does not cover drug expenses. A decrease in this price, which we denote by  max , captures stricter direct price regulation. By contrast, a price cap is a cost-sharing scheme which imposes a limit amount on the costs incurred by an insured patient which is reimbursed. Like coinsurance schemes, a price cap intends to keep insurance premiums low. The limit price is denoted by. We relate to a decrease in as stricter price cap.
Price Control
Suppose there is no health insurance, i.e., the coinsurance rate is 100 percent ( = 1).
A binding direct price control means that the price set by the government is below the equilibrium price. We therefore implicitly assume in this section that, for  = 1,  max   * and  max   * * hold. We focus on the simplest case where the government ignores R&D costs.
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With restricted entry, the equilibrium drug quality,  * , is given by
where function  was defined in (11). To see this, note that (11) reflects the first-order condition with respect to the R&D decision of firms and firms cannot set prices under direct price controls. Under free entry, which implies that firms' equilibrium profits are zero, equilibrium drug quality,  * * , and the number of firms,  * * , are simultaneously given by
where function  was defined by (15).
Proposition 3 (Price controls) Suppose there is a binding direct price control. (a)
16 Price controls follow a redistributive goal, aiming to reduce the financial burden of the ill vis-à-vis the healthy. Pharmaceutical prices in this regime are typically negotiated between pharmaceutical companies and the government. Critics of price controls argue that negotiated sales prices insufficiently account for R&D costs. The analysis would become more complicated if R&D costs and the effectiveness of drugs played a role in the setting  max .
Stricter price regulation (decrease in  max ) lowers the equilibrium quality of pharmaceuticals; with unrestricted entry, it also reduces the number of firms,  * * . (b) Under restricted entry, an increase in the number of firms, , unambiguously raises the quality of drugs,  * . With unrestricted entry, entry deregulation (decrease in ) raises both the quality of drugs,  * * , and  * * .
A stricter price control limits the price-cost margin,  max − , and therefore retards R&D incentives. The profit squeeze also retards entry. (part (a) of Proposition 3).
Deregulation of entry, which allows for a larger number of competitors, unambiguously raises R&D expenditure under direct price controls (part (b)). Similar to the discussion of the last result in Proposition 1, an increased number of drugs induces pharmaceuticals companies to retain some of its customers by raising R&D. As there is no counteracting effect on R&D incentives through reduced price-setting power, the result is unambiguous.
Price Caps
A health system which combines coverage of prescription drug expenses with a price cap  0 on reimbursement typically raises demand for drugs vis-à-vis a free market without any insurance. To see this, first note that the fair insurance premium under a binding price cap (i.e. one which is lower than the equilibrium price with full insurance)
is given by  = . Thus, total health expenditures for a customer of firm  is
Hence, a stricter price cap is not an intervention in a free market but restricts the drug expenditure subsidy to beneficiaries. Demand faced by pharmaceutical companies is lowered by a stricter price cap, since a decrease in lowers the marginal rate of substitution,  =     , in equilibrium with symmetric firms. This can be seen as follows. A customer of firm  with health status  has a consumption level of () −   + (1 − ). Thus,
The right-hand side of (19) is increasing in. We find the following result.
Proposition 4 (Price caps) A stricter price cap (decrease in) lowers both the price and quality of pharmaceuticals in symmetric equilibrium. Entry regulations have similar effects as in the basic model.
Since the marginal rate of substitution decreases with a stricter price cap, firms have less price setting power which in turn is associated with a decrease in R&D spending.
Regarding entry regulations, the same discussion as for Proposition 1 and 2 applies.
General Equilibrium with Endogenous Growth
In this section we extend the basic model (with a coinsurance scheme) to a simple dynamic general equilibrium framework with endogenous income growth. We examine the interaction between R&D spending of pharmaceutical companies and aggregate productivity in the consumption goods sector, endogenizing the wage rate, . One key feature of the analysis is to allow for individual labor supply to depend on health status. Consequently, illness and its pharmaceutical treatment may have effects on the scale of the economy and, thus, on productivity and wages.
Dynamic Set Up
Suppose that individuals inelastically supply their labor to a perfect labor market.
Output  of the numeraire consumption good at time  = 1 2  is produced under perfect competition, according to
productivity measure of input . 17   () can be affected by in-house R&D of singleproduct firm  in period .   is labor input in final goods production.  is the input of a resource which is available in fixed supply,, and has productivity . We assume that the associated factor market is competitive, i.e., the price of the fixed factor is .
17 Time index  is omitted whenever this does not lead to confusion.
The pharmaceutical sector is similar to the basic model. Suppose, however, that pharmaceutical companies use the fixed resource (rather than the numeraire) as input in both the R&D process and the production of pharmaceuticals. One unit of the fixed resource can be transformed into one unit of the drug, i.e., unit costs are , as in the partial equilibrium analysis. Also suppose that quality level  of a drug requires () units of the fixed factor, where  0  0,  00  0; 18 thus, R&D costs of pharmaceutical firms are given by () = (). We assume that  is proportional to the average productivity of the intermediate goods sector, i.e.,
capturing intersectoral spillover effects. The introduction of the fixed factor together with (21) implies that costs in the pharmaceutical sector grow with the same rate as.
This implies the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE). A BGE is defined
as a long run equilibrium in which all variables grow at a constant rate.
Productivity of an intermediate good  evolves according to
where We simplify the analysis by focussing on restricted entry in the pharmaceutical 18 We implicitly assume that −  − ( * )  0 holds. That is, in equilibrium, a positive amount of the fixed resource is used in the consumption good sector after  units of pharmaceuticals are produced and the resource is used for R&D input of the  pharmaceutical firms. As equilibrium quality of pharmaceuticals,  * , does not depend on, the condition holds whenever is sufficiently large. sector (i.e., the number of pharmaceutical firms, , is exogenous). Moreover, we assume that each individual lives one period and specify the utility function to ( ) = ln  +  (23) i.e.,   =   = 0.
Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We first look at the pharmaceutical sector by recalling the partial equilibrium analysis
In BGE, and turn out to be constant, i.e., the equilibrium price of pharmaceuticals and the wage rate grow with the same rate as average productivity. Moreover, note that () = (), according to (21). Thus, dividing (11) from Lemma 1 by implies that
Note that 0 ()  0, i.e., there is a positive relationship between productivity-adjusted prices and the quality of pharmaceuticals. Moreover, rewriting (12) by using (13) and (23), dividing by, and substituting (24) leads tô
Part (b) of Proposition 1 suggests that, under weak conditions, the relationship between   and   is positive. In fact, the numerator on the right-hand side of (25) is increasing
i.e., if the impact of better health on individual labor supply is small and/or decreasing fast, as plausible. Thus, assumption A1 is sufficient (but not necessary) for    0.
Now we look outside the pharmaceutical sector and at the labor market equilibrium.
Total labor supply   in the economy is the sum of labor supply of the healthy, 1 − , and of ill individuals:
Lemma 2. Outside the pharmaceutical sector, we find the following relationship between the productivity-adjusted wage and the quality of pharmaceuticals:
where   * is the (time-invariant) equilibrium R&D labor input of each intermediate
The growth rate of is given by (  * ) − 1 at all times and does neither depend on the coinsurance rate,  , nor on the number of pharmaceutical firms, .
Lemma 2 shows that the (adjusted) wage rate is positively related to aggregate labor supply in the economy. Thus, a better quality of pharmaceutical products is positively associated with the marginal product of labor in the final consumption sector, used extensively in both trade theory (e.g., Ethier, 1982) and endogenous growth theory (e.g., Romer, 1990) . Since equilibrium R&D labor input per intermediate good firm,   * , is independent of labor supply, there is no scale effect in the growth rate of, consistent with empirical evidence (Jones, 1995) . (14) holds.
(c) The growth rate of both the wage rate and prices of pharmaceuticals in BGE are independent of both  and .
As there are no transitional dynamics, a change in the coinsurance rate ( ) or in the number of pharmaceutical companies () leads to a jump towards the new BGE.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 can easily be understood. Recall that    0, according to (26). Thus, the  −curve in  −−space shifts leftward when the coinsurance rate increases, say, from  0 to  1   0 (see Fig. 2 ). As explained after Proposition 1, an increase in  makes demand for pharmaceuticals more price-sensitive. In turn, R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector declines for a given wage rate. In general equilibrium, this effect is associated with a lower wage rate whenever labor supply depends on health status.
To show that part (b) holds, recall from Proposition 1 that there may be a positive relationship between the number of pharmaceutical firms and pharmaceutical R&D spending per firm. For instance, if (14) holds, such that    0, the  −curve shifts rightward when the number of firms in the pharmaceutical sector, , increases.
Moreover, an increased choice set of pharmaceuticals improves average health status for a given drug quality . Thus, the −curve shifts upwards if  increases, whenever  0  0, according to (28). This reinforces the positive impact of higher entry on botĥ  and .
Finally, regarding part (c) of Proposition 5, recall that there is no scale effect with respect to the growth rate of average productivity, (  * ) − 1. Thus, both  and  grow with the same rate as. Consequently, both wage and price growth are independent of policy measures towards the pharmaceutical sector.
In addition to examining the effects of coinsurance schemes on wages and health, the analysis in this section contributes from the theoretical side to the recent debate on the impact of higher life expectancy through medical innovations on economic outcomes (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 1997; Aghion et al., 2010) . It suggests that the effect is positive, in line with Aghion et al. (2010) , if labor supply depends on health status.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of cost-sharing schemes in health insurance systems for prices of pharmaceuticals, R&D expenditure of pharmaceutical companies, aggregate productivity, and wages. The analysis suggests that extending coinsurance or applying stricter price regulations typically adversely affects pharmaceutical R&D spending while lowering drug prices. By contrast, lifting entry barriers may spur pharmaceutical innovations despite reducing price setting power. This happens when better suitability of a drug for patients, resulting from increased variety, leads to a sufficient increase in the effectiveness of R&D on health. In this case, stronger competition implies that firms attempt to retain some of their customers by quality-improvements in response to loss in market share. This calls into question the standard argument of pharma lobbyists that securing price-setting power − and therefore high profits − of pharmaceutical companies via entry regulation leads to high R&D spending. Examples for appropriate entry deregulation policies in the pharmaceutical sector would be to limit non-informative marketing expenses, to promote access of foreign pharmaceutical companies to domestic markets, or to reduce patent breadth. Thus, the analysis provides a differentiated view on the often debated conflict in health policy between saving costs in health insurance systems and providing R&D incentives of firms. The results suggest that such a trade-off exists with respect to the analyzed aspects of health insurance systems but not necessarily with respect to competition policy. More generally, extending the ideal variety framework to allow for vertical R&D seems valuable for industrial policy design also beyond the present context of pharmaceutical markets, e.g., for health services.
The analysis may also be helpful to predict supply effects of the 2006 Medicare reform in the US. This reform introduced coverage of expenses for prescription drugs, effectively reducing the coinsurance rate from 100 percent to 25 percent and less. Our results obtained in the coinsurance regime thus suggest that the reform induces pharmaceutical firms to intensify their innovative effort.
The general equilibrium extension of the basic model to an endogenous growth framework gives rise to the conclusion that lower R&D expenditure in the pharmaceutical sector is associated with a reduction in aggregate productivity, in turn depressing the wage rate per unit of labor, when individual labor supply depends on health status.
Future research may build on the proposed theory to quantify welfare effects and to derive socially optimal cost-sharing schemes. For instance, limiting the coinsurance rate on drug expenditures may be warranted for a number of reasons. First, there is the standard positive welfare effect of providing health insurance to risk-averse households.
Second, as focussed upon in this paper, R&D spending may be adversely related to the coinsurance rate. Thus, limiting cost-sharing may enlarge standard intertemporal "standing-on-shoulders" externalities from pharmaceutical R&D. For simplicity, such spillover effects have been ignored in this paper but should be allowed for in future research, along with other, possibly negative, R&D externalities (see e.g. Jones and Williams, 2000) .
The analysis has emphasized that a better health status from the provision of higherquality drugs may positively interact with the economic well-being of individuals. In a welfare analysis, also such effects would have to be weighted against higher prices for pharmaceuticals which result when coinsurance rates are lowered or price caps lifted.
Finally, it may be fruitful to investigate how the nature of price competition changes in the pharmaceutical sector along with R&D incentives when physicians have superior information and pursue own interests, e.g. influenced by sales representatives.
Appendix

A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The first-order conditions associated with profit-maximization problem (10) with respect to
Using the first equations of (3)- (6) in (8) and applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
Similarly, using the second equations of (3)- (6) in (9), we obtain
In a symmetric situation, where
for all , and thus
we have
= −05, according to (33) and (37), respectively, using (36) and (40). Thus, (30) holds. Moreover, (31) leads to (11), using (34) and (38) as well as again (36) and (40). Finally, using analogously (35), (39), (36) and (40) in (32) we obtain
Also note that   +   = 1  and   =  for all  imply that  = (1 −  ), according to (7). Thus,
according to (5) and (3). Finally, rewriting (11) to
substituting (43) into (41) and using (42) 
We have To prove part (c) note that  *   0 if   ≥ 0, according to (48). Using (12), we have
where 
.
From (51)- (54) we can confirm the impact of an increase in  and  on  * * and  * * (parts (a) and (b)). Concerning part (c), from (55), we find that  * *   0 if results in the case of unrestricted entry, recall that
Applying the implicit function theorem to (18), we thus find that
This concludes the proof. ¥ Proof of Proposition 4: As argued in subsection 5.2, health expenditures for a customer of firm  are   − +  (with  = ) rather than   +  compared to the basic model with coinsurance. Thus, (5) and (6) become
With this modification, the conditions for a profit maximum of firms under restricted entry in Lemma 1, eqs. (30)- (40), remain unchanged except that we have to set  = 1
in (35) 
If the number of firms is endogenous, equilibrium values ( * *   * *   * * ) are given by
Since  is increasing in, we have  0. The remainder of the proof is then analogous to the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 (where we used property    0) and implies that a decrease in has similar effects than an increase in  in the basic model.
A change in the number of firms has a similar effect on function than on function  of the basic model. This concludes the proof. ¥ Proof of Lemma 2: As the consumption good sector is competitive, it takes prices for intermediates as given. The inverse demand function for good  thus reads
Marginal costs are unity. Each firm maximizes (p() − 1) with respect to  which leads to an optimal price of 1 and therefore
where we used expression (67) for () and (22) for () in the latter equation. Maximizing (69) with respect to R&D labor input leads to first-order condition
Free entry in the intermediate goods sector implies that () = 0 for all . Combining (70) with the zero-profit condition by using (69) confirms (29).
Next, note that the wage rate is given by
Using (67), (22) and   () =   * we can write
Combining the two expressions (70) and (72), again using   () =   * , gives us
Labor market clearing implies that
Combining (73) and (74) 
Hence, as claimed in the text,  is proportional to labor supply,   . Dividing (72) bȳ   and using from (22) that
holds for all  in BGE implieŝ
Substituting (75) into (77) and using both (27) and (29) (25) and (28) give us two equations with two unknowns, and , in period . The two variables thus jump directly to a steady state; therefore also does, according to (24) . (27), (74), (75) as well as (21) we find that output is given by
Since   ,  and  are time-invariant in equilibrium,  grows with the same rate as from the initial period onwards. The same is true for individuals' equilibrium consumption of the final good, given by (42), as both  and  grow with the same rate as.
To confirm part (b) it suffices to note that when function  is not convex as a function of  (which may well be the case since   depends on third derivatives of functions ,  and ) then the  −curve and −curve may intersect more than once in  −−space. Finally, part (c) can be confirmed by using First, firms foresee the Bertrand equilibrium for any vector of horizontal and vertical location of firms and take the related equilibrium responses into account at stage 1.
Unfortunately, the analysis becomes intractable. The second way to analyze the two-stage problem is to assume that at stage 1 firms take prices of other firms as given (along with product quality and horizontal location) and therefore only foresee the impact of their choices on their price setting power for given prices of rivals. In this case, the behavior of firms is exactly the same as in the case where there is just one decision stage.
To see this, note that at stage 2 the optimal price of each firm fulfills first-order condition (32), which gives us the optimal price of firm . Recalling that ∆  is a
see that (32) gives us   implicitly as a function of
. Now, the optimization problem at stage 1 is:
where firms take as given
The first-order condition with respect to vertical differentiation   is:
Applying the envelope theorem, the term is squared brackets of (82) becomes zero, according to stage 2 first-order condition (32). Thus, (82) coincides with first-order condition (31) of the profit maximization problem (10). An analogous argument holds for the first-order condition with respect to horizontal differentiation   (  ) associated with profit maximization problem (81); it coincides with (30). This confirms the claim.
focus on simultaneous choices of horizontal location of firms and prices.
